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Abstract: The objective of this work is to critically discuss the collapse of Real 
Socialism in Eastern Europe through a perspective that brings together external and 
internal causes. The method employed for this is historical prospecting based on data 
and literature on the subject. The results indicate that the economic, social, and political 
contradictions of Real Socialism were the main causes for the end of this social regime. 
To achieve its objective, this work is divided into sections, which are organized 
according to a chronological order.  
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Real Socialism was an important social regime of XX century. Originated from 
the specific conditions of Soviet Union, this regime spread out throughout the world and 
once was considered a viable alternative for the problems of the capitalist mode of 
production. However, despite an initial success regarding quantitative economic growth, 
Real Socialism accumulated troubles which grew in complexity as time went by and 
eventually collapsed after seven decades of existence. In Eastern European, Real 
Socialism was implemented after the II World War and lasted for more than four 
decades. Eastern European Real Socialism started as a copy of the Soviet model but 
eventually acquired its own characteristics, although in a context of limited sovereignty 
that would only be changed in the late 1980s. 
The objective of this work is to critically discuss the end of Real Socialism in 
Eastern Europe through a perspective that brings together external and internal causes. 
The countries studied are eight: Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic 
Republic (GDR), Hungary, Poland, Romania and Yugoslavia. The usual explanations 
about the failure of Real Socialism range from the inefficiencies of economic planning 
to the oppressive social, institutional and political structures of this social regime, but 
these accounts lack the understanding about the complex interactions between the 
internal contradictions of Real Socialism and its international relations, especially the 
way that socialist countries entered the global market. This paper aims to amalgamate 
the external and internal reasons relatively to Eastern European countries that made 
1989 a crucial year in History.  
The method used to accomplish the objective of this work is historical 
prospecting based on data and literature on the subject. The results indicate that the 
internal contradictions of Eastern Europe’s Real Socialism combined with a particular 
historical configuration of the world economy after the 1970s and a series of reforms in 
the USSR, the center of the socialist bloc, was what made possible the astonishing turn 
of events of 1989 to 1991. In order to attain its objective, this paper will be organized 
into three sections. The first one covers the period between 1945 and 1961, the second 
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one the period 1961 to 1973 and the third one the period 1973 to 1991. Following these 
sections, there is a segment of concluding remarks. 
SECTION 1 (1945-1961) – POST-WAR RECONSTRUCTION AND DE-
STALINIZATION PROCESS 
The zones of geopolitical influence and post-World War II borders were 
established at the conferences of Yalta and Potsdam in 1945. There it was specified that 
Eastern Europe, with the exception of Greece, would be under the tutelage of the USSR. 
In this context of Soviet political dominance over Eastern European countries’ self-
determination, their social regimes were shaped after the Soviet one. This fact meant 
that the so-called “Stalinist model” was implemented throughout the region: 
bureaucratized economies and authoritarian social regimes, characterized by the 
presence of a privileged elite. The economic mechanism of the “Stalinist model” 
emphasized quantitative growth through heavy industrialization. In order to do this, the 
practice was to extracted surplus resources from the agricultural sector, what is known 
as “primitive socialist accumulation” (PREOBRAZHENSKY, 1965). Consequently, 
there was an atrophied consumer goods sector and difficulties with the supply of basic 
staples to the population.  
The first economic measures adopted in post-war Eastern Europe were 
administrative restructuring, expropriation of former capitalists, nationalization of major 
industries, institution of state monopoly on foreign trade, agrarian reform and 
introduction of economic planning. In 1948, relations between the USSR and 
Yugoslavia were severed, with the latter country following its own path of non-political 
alignment and a particular economic model based on firms’ self-management. In other 
countries, the economic system adopted was the “Stalinist model” until the 1960s. 
Economic reforms occurred in the 1950s, but they did not change the basic 
characteristics of the Stalinist economic mechanism. The most important changes took 
place in Poland, where the process of collectivization of agriculture was abandoned in 
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1956. In this country, private property was the predominant legal form in the 
agricultural sector. 
The planning system adopted in the 1940s and 1950s was composed of long-
term perspectives and annual plans, the latter being of an operational nature. Regarding 
the technical aspect of planning, the so-called “material balance” method was used to 
make economic plans feasible. In the 1950s the input-output matrix method was 
developed, which allowed a certain advance in the accuracy of planning. Economic 
planning used primarily physical performance indicators, so that volume of production 
was more important than profitability of operations. Economic decisions were 
centralized and there was a rigid decision-making hierarchy. The Stalinist economic 
mechanism ensured the centralization of decisions and resources so as to the priorities 
established were resolved. In the post-war case, the priority was industrialization. This 
was done in Eastern European countries, allowing them to take a quantitative leap in the 
development of their productive forces. Because of the scarcity of available resources, 
this industrialization effort implied a negligence in relation to the other sectors of the 
economy, especially the light and food industry. Restructuring of agriculture towards 
the extinction of private property in the countryside has brought additional difficulties 
in supplying staples to the population. 
Rationing in consumer goods resulting from these facts is one of the main causes 
for popular dissatisfaction with Eastern European governments in the 1950s. 
Additionally, oppression and repression over the population meant that these regimes 
had little popular legitimacy, even in those countries where the Communists had an 
important support base in the immediate postwar period. This scenario was aggravated 
by the technical difficulties with Stalinist-type economic planning, which ranged from 
the waste of resources to the excessive accumulation of inventories. The so-called “New 
Course” and the process of de-Stalinization did not solve these problems. This tense 
situation led to popular revolts (GDR in 1953, Hungary and Poland in 1956), with 
significant humanitarian and political costs (FEJTŐ, 1969; WILCZYNSKI, 1972: 33-
36).  
A critical analysis of the first decade of Eastern European Real Socialism must 
take into account the specificities of each country. However, in general terms, we can 
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make some critical assessments. Regarding the economic mechanism of these countries, 
it was implemented authoritarian and bureaucratic systems that oppressed workers. The 
workers were submitted to appalling conditions and were repressed by overarching state 
apparatuses. Basic civil liberties were taken away in the name of building socialism. 
Eastern European Real Socialism was a replica of the Soviet system, where the principle 
of “one-man management” was the mainstay of the enterprises’ organization. The 
exception was Yugoslavia, where firms were self-managed by the workers themselves.   
In merely quantitative terms, the Stalinist economic system served the post-war 
economic reconstruction purposes of the Eastern European countries. From a scarcity 
scenario left by the war, these countries succeeded in building an industrial base, which 
even overcame the prewar situation. In the following table we have the index of 
industrial production calculated by the statistical agency of the GDR, which compared 
the evolution of Eastern European countries industrial production level. The notable 
cases of rapid industrialization in Eastern Europe were the agrarian-based countries: 
Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, and Albania, which more than quadrupled their industrial 
output from the prewar level. 
Table 1 Industrial Production Index (1950=100)  
 1937 1955 1960 
Albania 24 277 603 
Bulgaria 32 190 397 
Hungary 62 184 265 
Yugoslavia 59 141 262 
Poland 45 212 338 
GDR 90 190 292 
Romania 68 202 340 
Czechoslovakia 70 170 282 
Source: STATISTISCHES JAHRBUCH DER DDR, 1962: Anhang, III, 17.  
This rapid industrialization was not without costs, since most of the available 
resources were allocated to heavy industrialization and not to light industry and 
agriculture. Along with the economic, political and social problems of Real Socialism, 
such costs imposed by the industrialization policy have resulted in a trajectory of social 
instability. The pressure exerted by the population dissatisfied with the quantity and 
quality of consumer goods was growing since the beginning of the 1950s, particularly in 
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countries with a previous industrial base (East Germany, Czechoslovakia and, to a 
lesser extent, Hungary and Poland). At the same time, the repressive state of affairs that 
characterized the relationship between citizens and governments meant that civil 
societies were unsatisfied with the first years of Real Socialism. These factors were 
translated as popular demands for economic and political changes.  
As we said earlier these countries experienced important social upheavals. These 
events had immediate political repercussions but did not bring about significant changes 
in the economic mechanism of Eastern European countries: reforms in the “Stalinist 
model” remained marginal, without altering the main features of this system (with the 
exception of Poland, where the collectivization of agriculture was phased out). 
Yugoslavia was a separate case, since the country abandoned the “Stalinist model” and 
the costs required by the accelerated industrialization effort were reduced due to the 
greater participation of workers in economic and political life, which does not mean that 
these costs did not exist, because during the phase of the so-called "global 
industrialization"2 the industrial sector had an explicit preference over the agricultural 
one.  
All in all, the post war period in Eastern Europe was characterized by the 
implementation of the “Stalinist model”. The countries of this region became part of the 
Soviet geopolitical sphere of influence and they henceforth had a limited sovereignty in 
their internal affairs. The “Stalinist model” was a centralized, wasteful and authoritarian 
economic system and brought in the bureaucratization of social life in Eastern Europe. 
At the same time, the Stalinist economic mechanism was functional to concentrate 
resources in one specific sector of the economy, and this was done with regard to heavy 
industrialization. Light industries and the agricultural sector lagged far behind in this 
first phase of Real Socialism. In this process of implementation of a new social regime, 
the elites of Real Socialism managed to amass privileges in relation to average citizens.  
                                                 
2  Global industrialization was the name given to the industrialization policy of 
Yugoslavia between 1945 and 1955. This type of industrialization was based on the Stalinist model 
(BICANIC, 1976: 108-111). 
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SECTION 2 (1961-1973) – ECONOMIC REFORMS: CAUSES, 
DEBATES AND RESULTS 
In the 1960s Eastern Europe economies faced a reduction in its economic 
growth pace. The large growth rates obtained during the effort of economic 
reconstruction after World War II faded away and a slowdown was registered in the 
early 1960s. Considering Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, GDR, Hungary, Poland, Romania 
and the USSR, the average annual rate of growth3 which had been 9.1% during the 
period between 1956 and 1960, declined to 6.2% during the period 1961-1965. In East 
Germany, for example, net material product growth rose from an annual average of 
11.08 per cent between 1950 and 1959 to 4.5 per cent in 1960, 1.6 per cent in 1961 and 
2.7 per cent in 1962 (JEFFRIES & MELZER, 1987: 10; TDR, 1982: 159).  
At the same time that the “Stalinist model” was losing its capacity to generate a 
strong pace of economic growth, the elites of Real Socialism embarked on a path of 
reinforcing the concept that Real Socialism countries could catch up and overtake the 
levels of productivity of the capitalist countries. This campaign was most notorious in 
the USSR and the GDR but influenced all Eastern Europe and it was an attempted to 
legitimize the power held by bureaucratic casts through the idea that socialism was a 
better system than capitalism even with regard to the levels of productivity. In this way, 
a productivist logic guided Real Socialism, so that the construction of socialism was not 
synonymous with a qualitative change in the relations of production, but socialism was 
equated with a mere quantitative increase of production.  
The productivist logic favored that: (i) in the labor sphere, the relations of 
production were similar to those prevailing under capitalism (intensification of labor 
was desirable for many reasons, first of all to exceed capitalist levels of production); (ii) 
in the political sphere, the upper social stratum accumulated privileges and social 
differentiation from the mass of workers; and (iii) in the macroeconomic sphere, it was 
considered as a desirable strategy to use the international capitalist market for greater 
supply of credit and goods, without taking into account the consequences associated 
                                                 
3  Measured by Net Material Product. 
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with this strategy. The productivist logic and these three consequences conditioned the 
fate of Real Socialism. Besides of being authoritarian and bureaucratized regimes, these 
regimes exploited workers, fostered social differentiation and, despite all the rhetoric of 
economic planning, they did not design a well-defined strategy to interact with the 
capitalist world market without bringing financial restraints to their foreign accounts, as 
it eventually happened in the late 1970s and 1980s. 
The reason for the economic decline of the late 1950s and early 1960s was 
attributed by Eastern European scholars to the exhaustion of growth possibilities based 
on the extensive use of resources, particularly in the industrialized countries such as 
GDR and Czechoslovakia, and because the policy changes of the 1950s (the "New 
Course") did not produce the desired results. As these economies recovered from the 
destruction caused by the war, their structures became more complex, with increasing: 
(i) number of goods produced, (ii) production methods employed, (iii) alternatives 
available to planners, and (iv) demands of consumers. At the same time, there was 
decreasing: (i) sources of natural resources and (ii) available manpower. This new set of 
conditions was impelling a shift from an extensive regime of growth to an intensive one. 
Therefore, policymakers were constrained to change governance techniques 
related to the planning and management systems in order to reignite economic growth in 
a different material context. This state of affairs meant that discussions about economic 
reforms were put on the table almost throughout Eastern Europe. Wrapped in an aura of 
technicism and scientism, the reforms proposals supposedly intended to reduce the 
spheres of economic life influenced by political considerations. However, in reality the 
central point of discussion was how to create an economic environment suitable for 
intensive growth without questioning the basic tenet of Real Socialism, namely the 
status quo of the distribution of power and the oppressive character of the relations of 
production. This determined that the main idea advocated by reformists was how to 
create mechanisms capable of increasing labor productivity and avoiding the waste of 
resources, without any questioning about the privileges of Real Socialism’s elites.  
In order to improve labor productivity and reduce the waste of resources, 
reformists contended that it was necessary to attack Stalinist system’s troubles with 
respect to these two issues, since the Stalinist economic mechanism was an economic 
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system whose orientation was aimed at a rapid quantitative increase of production 
through heavy industrialization and not directed to address questions concerning the 
intensive regime of economic growth. The Stalinist system exhibited important 
shortcomings: often the plans had an ad hoc character; there was deficiencies in the 
coordination of the various sectors of the economy; difficulties in the transmission of 
information; problems with coordination between future investments and current 
economic plans; performance indicators measured in volume production, leading to 
waste and lack of care with costs and product quality; excess demand for consumer 
goods; etc (ELLMAN, 1979: 42-50).  
Faced with these problems in the functioning of the Stalinist system, discussions 
about changes in the economic mechanism took place both within the ruling parties and 
in academic circles. Eastern European economists, in general, pointed to the following 
reform proposals as a solution to these shortcomings: (i) give more decision-making 
power to companies so that decisions were decentralized and thus enlarge the space for 
innovation and experiences at company level; (ii) create a price system adequate to the 
cost structures of firms; (iii) take measures to mitigate waste in the use of inputs and 
means of production (for example, charging interest for the use of machinery and 
equipment); (iv) reform performance indicators in order to adapt incentives to work to a 
situation of cost minimization, material motivation and efficiency; and (v) tailor 
products to consumer needs and international trade requirements (BORNSTEIN, 1977: 
105-106, DOBB, 1970: 29).  
These solutions, as good as they sound, were not meant to replace socialism with 
capitalism: they were meant to modernize the socialist economy through the permanent 
use of the market and its social categories as an instrument to increase productivity and 
perfect the economic mechanism. Even the overarching economic planning through 
administrative orders was to be replace by a merely indicative economic planning 
system with economic agents guided by mercantile incentives towards desired ends. 
The market mechanism was regarded as something capable of make the economy 
function to the maximum of its potential, so that the supposedly superiority, especially 
in terms of productivity, of the socialist economy over capitalism could be proven by 
quantitative results. This expected result did not arrive after all: socialist economies 
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lagged behind in terms of productivity especially after the technological innovations of 
the capitalist countries in the 1970s.  
In this context, during the 1960s reforms in the planning and management 
system took place throughout Eastern Europe. The reforms varied widely across the 
region but the main idea was to use the market and its categories to perfect the 
economic system. On this account, Real Socialism seemed to draw near to capitalism as 
the so-called socialist countries adopted market instruments to guide their economies. 
As capitalism is characterized by the widespread presence of economic planning 
(although there is not a global plan that encompass overall social production) then in the 
1960s there was the apex of the “Convergence theories” which asserted that both 
economic systems (capitalism and socialism) would eventually converge to a synthesis 
that combined economic planning with market mechanisms. As we know, this did not 
happen. 
The most radical reforms regarding the presence of mercantile elements 
occurred in Yugoslavia, Hungary and Czechoslovakia. While the former abandoned 
central planning once and for all, in Hungary a few elements were retained that 
prevented conversion to a full market economy, especially the fact that economic 
planning existed on important fields of the economy. Both countries had strong 
interference of the State in the economy, but this does not determine if an economy is a 
market economy or not. What defines a market economy is the presence of the law of 
value as the regulator of social production. In Czechoslovakia the reforms moved 
forward to a pro-mercantile direction, but they retreated in the early 1970s within the 
framework of the "Normalization" policy. 
The reforms did not manage to solve the problems that afflicted Eastern Europe 
economies. For example, the presence of a second economy in these countries continued 
to be one of the defining features of Real Socialism. The economic mechanism 
remained cumbersome and wasteful. The main complaints concerning the old planning 
and management system were that it was inflexible, careless in regard to the resources 
of the economy, unable to bring technological innovations and incapable to adapt itself 
to the demands of consumers. The attempted solution was to decentralize decisions, to 
form intermediary entities between central government and firms or even to abandon 
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central planning altogether, and to use profit as a decisive factor for economic decisions 
and as a prime incentive for those involved in production. Although this solution was in 
certain cases a temporary one, it must be note that it expanded the role of mercantile 
elements, as material incentives, in the economic life of these societies.  
 It is important to point out that the economic reforms of the 1960s, and its 
debates, did not approach the question of Real Socialism’s elites, the social strata that 
despotically allocated economic resources through administrative means. In fact, the 
social regimes of Eastern Europe fossilized into burdensome state apparatus with a 
encrusted social layer that struggled by all means to maintain its privileges. In this 
sense, they became conservatives: the utmost priority of Real Socialism’s elites was to 
conserve the status quo. Official institutions maintained a position that the sacrifices 
entailed by Real Socialism was the price to be paid to build a qualitative distinct society 
from capitalism but this ideological structure was soon perceived by the population as a 
hollow one and lost its credibility altogether.  
In summary, Eastern European reformists took the relations of production as 
given and sought to perfect the economic planning. In the case of the 1960s, this search 
for the optimal plan was equated to improvements in the transmission of information 
between productive units and State’s central institutions, which would be done through 
the use of the market and its categories (profits, wages, prices, bonuses, etc.), especially 
material incentives to work. Power of dominant elites and the separation of workers 
from the control of their own labor process were not questioned. Reforms lasted longer 
in Hungary and Yugoslavia; in both countries, they altered significantly the functioning 
of their respective economic mechanisms. 
The reason because, except Yugoslavia and Hungary, the reforms of Real 
Socialism were short-lived is that to decentralize decision-making stances was 
something disturbing to the “homeostasis” of Real Socialism, since the basic pillar of 
this system was the concentration of power in the elites, which despotically allocated 
resources and amassed privileges. At the same time that elites of Real Socialism craved 
for new spaces of private accumulation through the fostering of mercantile relations 
they feared the decentralization of their power. This contradiction was resolved into an 
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increased role for the second economy, where private accumulation of resources could 
take place, and into a temporarily stoppage of reforms proposals. 
SECTION 3 (1973-1991) – THE FINAL DECLINE OF REAL 
SOCIALISM 
 Real Socialism entered the 1970s as a consolidated social system that appeared 
to the layman as a viable alternative to capitalism. The system achieved stability by 
frozen into an overarching state apparatus controlled by an elite that maintained a tight 
grip over society. The economic mechanism faced several problems but it was able to 
keep growing quantitatively. In the age of détente, socialist countries increased the 
relationship with capitalist countries and this improved the average quality of life of 
their citizens, especially in terms of the available basket of consumer goods since the 
oppressive character of Real Socialism’s states did not changed.  
 Despite this apparent stability, Real Socialism collapsed in the late 1980s due to 
its many problems and contradictions and a specific set of historical events. One of the 
problems of Eastern European countries was the frailty of their balance of payments that 
was increasingly under pressure during the 1970s and 1980s. This was due to the 
difficulties that these countries had to generate hard currency through exports. In the age 
of détente, socialist countries increased their financial and trade relations with the 
capitalist countries and this brought troubles later on since the international market is 
regulated under capitalist terms. Eastern European countries even made use of foreign 
indebtedness to finance their external accounts. The strategy of borrowing in the 
international financial market, which at first seems very strange for socialist countries, 
was present in most countries of Eastern Europe during the 1970s and 1980s. This fact 
shows that they were not able to maintain an advantageous relationship with the 
capitalist global market, which is regulated directly by the law of value.  
 The adoption of this type of strategy was not an “idiopathic” phenomenon but 
something entrenched in the manner by which Real Socialism dealt with the question of 
raising productivity levels. In other words, this was a direct consequence of the policy 
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of the privileged elites to legitimize themselves through the idea that socialism was a 
better system than capitalism in all spheres, even in regard to productivity levels. That is 
to say, they founded the construction of so-called socialist societies in an attempt to 
reach and surpass the levels of productivity and consumption of capitalist countries. 
Inasmuch as it proposed a "duel" with the capitalist countries, the socialist bloc needed 
to import technology, production goods and consumer goods precisely from the 
countries with they competed. Between 1970 and 1981, Eastern European countries 
increased the volume of imports of goods and services from capitalist countries by nine 
times. In the same period, gross external debt with the capitalist countries went from 
US$ 4.6 to US$ 69.1 billion. As a result, socialist countries re-entered the capitalist 
global market, from which they were relatively isolated in the 1950s and early 1960s 
(BUNCE, 1985: 36-39).  
 The late 1960 and the 1970s were characterized by an expansion of international 
liquidity as a result of the end of Bretton Woods, growth of the Eurodollar market and 
the oil shock of 1973. In this context of abundant international liquidity, Eastern 
European countries followed the path of foreign indebtedness to finance their external 
accounts. Because of the chronic difficulty of these countries to obtain hard currency on 
the international market, in order to meet its financial obligations they later embarked 
on monetary tightening and/or negotiations with creditors and international agencies, 
such as the IMF and the World Bank. The exception was Albania, which did not get 
into debt in the international financial market, but the rupture of its relations with China 
after Mao Zedong's death brought serious economic problems for the country 
(KOTKIN, 2010).  
There is a myriad of indicators to analyse the evolution of foreign debt and a 
country’s capacity of payment. One good, although incomplete, illustration is the 
evolution of net debt. The chart below shows the sum of convertible currency net debt 
of Eastern Europe (Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, 
Poland, Romania) and Yugoslavia in 1975, 1980, 1985 and 1989 (VIFCES, 1991: 391). 
The pattern of debt growth followed the vagaries of the international financial market: 
as liquidity was readily available (1970s and late 1980s) the level of debt increased; 
otherwise, when channels of financing were severed, countries of Eastern Europe were 
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pressed to adjustments. This fact reveals that the internal logic of Real Socialism, the 
productivist logic, pushed policy makers to a vicious cycle of resorting to the global 
capitalist market in order to try to close the gap between capitalist and socialist 
productivity levels.   
Chart 1 – Convertible currency net debt - in million US Dollar 
 
Source: Elaborated with data from VICFES, 1991: 391. 
 The foreign debt strategy responded to a goal that the leaders of Eastern 
European countries identified as fundamental: reach and surpass the productivity and 
consumption levels of capitalist countries. Pressed by domestic troubles resulting from 
the many problems and contradictions of Real Socialism, Eastern European elites did 
not consider the risks associated with an import-led growth strategy. The loans obtained 
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The wave of indebtedness indicates that socialist economies were not able to 
escape the pattern of accumulation prevalent in the capitalist world market. In a sense, 
this indicate the failure of Real Socialism not only as an economic alternative but as an 
integration process between countries which shared the same social regime. 
Theoretically, a feasible alternative to increase productivity and consumption would be 
neither careless entanglement with the capitalist world market or the pursue of an 
autarchic route, but rather the deepening of economic relations within the COMECON 
(Council for Mutual Economic Assistance) bloc. In this way, countries of Real 
Socialism would be able to exploit economies of scale and scope without resorting to 
the capitalist global market and its particular logic of accumulation. Although this could 
do little to reduce the technological gap between the capitalist and socialist blocs, it 
would, at least theoretically, diminish the dependence ties entailed by the presence of 
vulnerability in the foreign accounts. 
Nevertheless, COMECON's activities remained limited to certain isolated 
projects, without promoting a genuine integration of the economies of the socialist bloc; 
in particular a conjoint process of economic planning that included foreign trade and 
international financial operations. The reason for this lack of cooperative articulation 
was the political disarray within the bloc that prevented the effective integration of 
Eastern European economies. There were several reasons for the existence of this 
disharmony. First of all, the interests of capitalist countries in foster skirmishes between 
socialist countries in order to prevent a useful coordination of efforts. Nothing older 
than “divide to reign”. Proof of this are the economic favors that Tito and Ceausescu 
had managed to gather because they drew away from the USSR. Furthermore, the 
political predominance of the Soviet Union over the Eastern European countries was 
another factor that divided the socialist bloc. The constant interference of the USSR in 
the internal politics of these countries fueled the erosion of relations among the so-
called “satellite countries” and USSR and fostered hostility towards the Soviets. 
Another polemic was the presence of Warsaw Pact troops ready to intervene if any of 
the region's governments were threatened by political forces opposed to Soviet and local 
elites’ interests. This happened effectively in the GDR in 1953, in Hungary in 1956 and 
in Czechoslovakia in 1968. The possibility of invasion was credible in Poland in 1956 
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and 1981. These threats and military interventions were some of the important causes 
for the lack of unity of the socialist bloc.  
If in the 1970s Eastern European economies, fueled by external liquidity, 
maintained a modest but positive level of economic growth, in the 1980s the region’s 
difficulties to sustain even its ordinary pace of growth progressively worsened. On the 
one hand, foreign creditors and capitalist countries were eager to receive their debt 
payments; on the other, civil societies demanded increasing sophistication of 
consumption patterns and opposed the restrictive adjustments and deflationary policies 
implemented to solve external sector’s problems of these countries and generate hard 
currencies. Moreover, the USSR presented serious difficulties in its economy so that the 
always expected Soviet aid to the “satellite countries” ended up not happening. In this 
scenario, the necessity for changes became compelling and it was put on the agenda 
again after the first round of the late 1950s and 1960s. Hans-Herman Höhmann 
(HÖHMANN, 1989: 18-19) explained that the unsatisfactory economic situation and 
the need to increase exports and obtain hard currencies were among the reasons for the 
1980s renewal of the economic reform movement in Real Socialism (HÖHMANN, 
1989: 19): 
… the East European economies' hard-currency debt which had 
soared in the 1970s and had then been reduced (or at least had ceased 
to grow so rapidly) in the early 1980s, is at present expanding more 
rapidly again, putting them under persistent pressure to consolidate. 
Eastern Europe's overall hard-currency debt currently totals some 
130 billion dollars. In the light of this high level of debt, the countries 
of Eastern Europe have been and indeed still are intensifying their 
efforts to export to the West and to the USSR, with the result that a 
widening discrepancy has opened up between domestic production 
and consumption. On the expenditure side, they have been attempting 
to cope with this pressure for consolidation especially by curbing 
capital formation, which, in turn, has been restricting the resources 
available for investment policy for the purposes of modernization and 
has almost inevitably led to the need to bridge the deficits in capital 
formation by striving for higher-quality economic processes - and that 
means by reforms. In view of the increasing importance attributed to 
foreign trade, an intensive search for new, more effective forms of 
international economic co-operation has also been launched.  
According to Höhmann (HÖHMANN, 1989: 19), the other reason for the 
resurgence of the reformist movement was that Soviet perestroika motivated new 
endeavors of economic and political reforms in Eastern Europe. In fact, the reforms in 
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the USSR (perestroika, glasnost, uskoreniye, demokratizatsiya) promoted a political 
effervescence in Eastern Europe and brought about important transformations. As Real 
Socialism’s political, economic, and social contradictions deepened, the Eastern Europe 
regimes began a process of reconversion to capitalism. The first case was that of Poland, 
where the government faced strong opposition from the Solidarity union, the Catholic 
Church and the population beset by the economic crisis. After came Hungary, where the 
transition to the new social regime was simpler than in the Polish case, because the 
economy was already close to capitalism.  
Then in the fall and winter of 1989 there was the fall of the Berlin Wall, the 
“Velvet Revolution” in Czechoslovakia, the meeting between Gorbachev and Bush at 
the Malta Summit, the pro-capitalist reforms led by the Communists in Bulgaria and the 
deposition of Ceausescu in Romania. Therefore, 1989 was a year in which Eastern 
Europe's geopolitical framework was profoundly changed. Following this year, there 
were also transformations towards capitalism in Yugoslavia and Albania. In the first 
case, it is somewhat difficult to talk about a reconversion to capitalism, since the 
country was effectively a market economy since 1965, but further moves in direction to 
a full changeover of the economy to capitalism were taken. And in the second case, the 
reconversion to capitalism was led by the Albanian Labor Party (PPSH) itself after 
massive popular protests at the end of 1990 and beginning of 1991 due to the precarious 
economic and social situation of the country. 
 The causes for the demise of Real Socialism lie in its own internal problems 
(namely, in the political, economic, and social contradictions of each country) and in a 
particular international state of affairs which combined the entanglement of Eastern 
European economies with the capitalist world and the changes in USSR. In fact, what 
made it possible for astonishing transformations to occur at such rapid pace throughout 
the region were the Soviet reforms from 1985 onwards. These reforms, besides boosting 
reformist movements in Eastern European countries, included the replacement of the 
“Brezhnev Doctrine” for a “new political thinking” in the conduct of Soviet foreign 
policy. This change in Soviet foreign policy granted greater space of action for the 
“satellite countries” to restore sovereignty and follow their own path, something they 
had longed for since the end of II World War.  
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 The “Brezhnev Doctrine” was the policy of intervention by Warsaw Pact troops 
if one of the countries of the Warsaw Pact faced internal or external challenges in 
respect to the continuation of Real Socialism, so the countries of this pact had a de facto 
limited sovereignty. The “new political thinking” was the idea that international 
relations were supposed to take a pragmatic approach, and not an ideological one, 
because in the so-called modern world relations between countries were allegedly 
characterized primarily by interdependency and not by rivalry. The core underlying 
interest in this “new thinking” was to reduce military expenses since the Soviet 
economy was in serious difficulties. The end of potential oppression was what freed 
Eastern European policymakers to search for a new model for their societies inasmuch 
as Real Socialism was lagging behind Western European social democracies in terms of 
average quality of life and this was not take for granted by the population of Eastern 
European countries. Besides, internal contradictions of Real Socialism were only 
getting more complex as time passed by and these problems seemed insurmountable if 
profound reforms did not take place. 
 The Eastern European reformists promoted a return to capitalism in an abrupt 
but, in most cases, peaceful transition. As stated by the “new political thinking”, the 
Soviet Union did not interfere in order to maintain the status quo in Eastern Europe. 
The population of this region, beleaguered by the problems of Real Socialism, saw in 
capitalism an outlet for greater political freedom, the end of police and intellectual 
repression, a resumption of the right to travel beyond the borders of Eastern Europe, 
access to a larger and better basket of consumption goods and the extinction of 
privileges of the elites that dominated these countries. In this manner, popular support 
for the transformations was present and a new trajectory was followed by Eastern 
European countries. 
In summary, after the peak of hostilities which was the Cuban missile crisis, the 
world entered in a phase of conciliation between the capitalist and the socialist bloc, 
which resulted in some of the Cold War’s landmarks as the Salt Treaty, the Helsinki 
Conference and the Ostpolitik in Germany. In regard to our investigation, the age of 
détente was important because increased the interaction between capitalist and socialist 
countries, which eventually meant rising difficulties to socialist countries with respect 
19 
 
to the management of their external accounts. The countries of Eastern Europe were not 
prepared to enter the global capitalist market except in a subordinate position, because 
they lacked the technological and productivity levels that would make them competitive 
players able to generate hard currencies through trade.  
One can argument that this increased relationship with the capitalist countries 
was not at all a decisive factor in the final destiny of Real Socialism, but the important 
thing is not the magnitude of the socialist countries’ participation in the global capitalist 
market, but the fact that this was something strange to the normal functioning of Eastern 
European economies and therefore it was something very difficult to accommodate into 
the fossilized world of Real Socialist bureaucratic economies. The point is that, once 
created, the Eastern European economies’ external problems could not be permanently 
resolved since there was not sufficient endogenous technological creation in the 
socialist countries and sooner or later they had to face the fact that in order to reduce the 
productivity gap from the capitalist economies they were forced to import goods and 
services from their so-called rivals. This contradiction was resolved into the constitution 
of a dependence relationship that reduced the room to maneuver of the socialist bloc of 
countries. 
This dependence relationship was one of the causes for the demise of Real 
Socialism, along with its own internal economic, political and social problems and a 
specific set of events in international relations that made feasible the wave of regime 
changes in Eastern Europe. The internal problems ranged from wasteful economies 
grounded on a productivist logic to oppressive and repressive states. The international 
events corresponded mainly to the reforms in the USSR. Eastern Europe had a limited 
sovereignty since the 1940s and this impeded the forces that claimed for autonomous 
development to assert themselves. As the Soviet Union granted independence to Eastern 




What we saw in this text was that internal contradictions combined with a set of 
specific external circumstances seal the fate of Eastern European Real Socialism. The 
most obvious internal contradictions were the authoritarian political regimes and the 
bureaucratic economic systems. Both formed a prosperous environment for the 
reproduction of the elites’ privileges in respect to the general population. Besides these 
two problems, there was the question of the quality of relations of production, the 
prevalence of a productivist logic and the lack of effective integration between socialist 
countries. The external circumstances comprise, among other things, the increasing 
integration with the global capitalist market and reforms in the USSR, the center of the 
socialist bloc. 
The “Stalinist model” implemented in Eastern Europe after the II World War 
brought with itself all the problems that the USSR had been suffering. The “Stalinist 
model” was sustained by a repressive apparatus which was present even in the labor 
place. In such manner, the promises that socialism would bring a new society 
qualitatively different from the preceding one were broken as fast as oppressive regimes 
were implemented throughout the region. The processes of bureaucratization and of 
repression over the population soon dominated social life. Over the years, plentiful 
attempted reforms did not change these features of Real Socialism. At the heart of the 
matter, Real Socialism’s elites did not intend to build a qualitative distinct society but 
they just aimed to follow a productivist logic of endless quantitative economic growth 
in order to reinforce its privileges and perpetuate itself in power. The ultimate result was 
that they lose any remaining popular support because at the same time they spoke out 
values as equality, workers’ empowerment, altruism, common good, and so on, they had 
a standard of living better than average people. This hypocrisy corroded the legitimacy 
of these regimes and was one of the important causes of their collapse.  
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